The Manhattan Project was the research and development of the atom bomb during World War II, which was subsequently used on Japan. It has been chosen as it is an extreme example of a wicked problem that clearly illustrates the divide between the successful scientific rational approach and the moral, ethical dilemmas and repercussions that still exist today, over 70 years later, with nuclear weapons. It is noted that most problems termed as wicked are not as extreme or impactful on human life.


The Atom Bomb

From a historical event, the Manhattan Project initiated during World War II to research and develop the atom bomb, highlights both the strengths and weakness of a rational scientific approach. It is impossible to make a rational scientific judgement on whether the bomb should have been researched and developed, built and used in August of 1945 on Japan. Having an understanding of the context at the time of the Manhattan Project, give hints to motivations of the people involved and why it also succeeded in a technical sense. A common thread through this site is context is extremely important.

Context of Manhattan Project

Many authors have published various opinions regarding this period, some in disagreement with each other, particularly regarding the use of the atom bomb and what should have happened post-World War II. Most agree with the following sentiment:

Los Alamos was unique in its enormous concentration of first-rate people who constantly gave proof of what could be accomplished by their working together on very circumscribed goals. It was, in fact, a collaboration of unparalleled intensity, a cooperative task undertaken by outstanding people into which everyone threw themselves completely and single-mindedly, and to which everyone gave their ideas, experience, and energy fully, freely, and selflessly. The intensity resulted in the total effort being much greater than the sum of its parts. And everyone shared in the credit. (Schweber, 2008)

Two of the world’s greatest scientists at the time of World War II acted according to their concerns and beliefs. This is not to question the validity of their concerns or beliefs, only to highlight the context in which these two great scientists acted.

Albert Einstein did not actually participate in the development of the atom bomb, his only contribution to that effort was to sign a letter to President Roosevelt.

My only contribution with respect the atomic bomb was that, in 1939, I signed a letter to President Roosevelt in which I called attention to the existing possibility of producing such a bomb and the dangers that the Germans might make use of that possibility. I consider this my duty because there were definite indications that the Germans were working on such a project. (Nathan and Norden, 1968)

The other great scientist at the time was Robert Oppenheimer whose contribution to the development of the atom bomb was a major reason of its success.

After the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 and particularly after the fall of France in June 1940, Oppenheimer came to believe that Western civilization was in grave danger. After France, one of the bastions of Western civilization, fell, Oppenheimer committed himself to seeing that Britain and the United States would not fall as well. He publicly stated: “We have to defend western values against the Nazis.” (Schweber, 2008)

For both of these great scientists, fear that the Germans might develop and use such a weapon was a driving factor in their actions. This fear was subsequently shown to be misplaced, but the initial fear was a major catalyst for them and yet their actions differed.

Successful development

The Manhattan Project was an extremely challenging scientific and engineering project provided with all the resources required with the single goal to develop the atom bomb. The secrecy of the Project helped in that no opposition for moral/ethical or any other reasons was mounted. There were many brilliant scientists and engineers involved that may have had differences in opinion in the technical or scientific issues. Though what united them together was the overall goal and motivation where there were no diverging opinions, including a sense of being involved in something much greater than themselves. In effect they each shared a purpose with their individual contributions to a whole.

The reminiscences of many of the physicists who participated in the wartime project at Los Alamos give the sense that they looked back upon that experience as if Los Alamos had been a utopia. They had believed that they were in a frantic race to save Western democracies from the possibility of Nazi Germany obtaining such a weapon first since work on such developments had started there two years earlier. They knew they were involved in an enterprise, which, if successful, would change the course of human affairs. And after the Trinity test, the first nuclear explosion in history, they hoped that atomic bombs would secure a lasting peace. (Schweber, 2008)

A supporting note quotes Oppenheimer

“Los Alamos was a remarkable community, inspired by a high sense of mission, of duty and of destiny, coherent, dedicated and remarkably selfless. There was plenty in the life of Los Alamos to cause irritation…. but I have never known a group more understanding and more devoted to a common purpose, more willing to lay aside personal convenience and prestige, more understanding in the role that they were playing in their country’s history. Time and time again we had in the technical work almost paralyzing crises. Time and time again the laboratory drew itself together and faced the new problems and got on with the job. We worked by night and by day; and in the end the many jobs were done”. (Schweber, 2008)

Charles Thorpe a biographer of Oppenheimer states that Oppenheimer was celebrated at Los Alamos for his ability to see the big picture: to synthesize the entire body of science involved in the project and, from this overall perspective, to bring order and cohesion to decision making and discourse. (Thorpe, 2006)

The big picture in this context refers to the scientific, technical and resourcing nature aimed at successfully completing the Manhattan Project. In this respect the boundaries of the project excluded any concept of ethics or morality; future implications of success; or guilt of use of the bomb.

Throughout his life Oppenheimer emphasized that Los Alamos was an engineering project. The physicists who worked on the problems of designing and building the first atomic bombs did so as applied scientists and as high-level engineers. (Schweber, 2008)

He made apparent that he was a man wracked by guilt and self-doubt, yet he pulled back from a repudiation of the bomb. It was a guilt that he would not allow to be attached to any particular source or site. Hence his comment in Japan that he felt no worse on arriving there than previously. In 1961, he even went so far as to say, carry no weight on my conscience,” in reference to the atomic bombings. For, he said, the use of science was a problem for government, not for the scientists. (Thorpe, 2006)

There is no doubt of Oppenheimer’s ability to direct such a complex project requiring broad scientific knowledge and ability to lead a large team of highly skilled people while managing to balance what would have been extremely high scrutiny, expectations and demands from the armed forces and government.

Post Manhattan Project

It is the post Manhattan Project period that other factors came to the forefront. Questions regarding should the Manhattan Project have gone ahead; should the atom bomb have been used and if so under what conditions; once the war was over what should have happened regarding the further development or building of atomic weapons; what were the thoughts and emotions of Oppenheimer and Einstein after the war.

An official view that is passionately disputed and argued by many . . . was that the atomic bombs were used to end the war as quickly as possible and save lives, and in particular to avoid an invasion of the Japanese mainland. While others present an alternative reason . . . the reasoning behind the attacks was not primarily a moral utilitarian calculation, but simply power politics between the United States and the Soviet Union writ large.” (Day, 2016)

There are many such questions and opinions given by people with strong convictions in their personal views that no scientific rational methodology is capable of providing an answer as morality and ethics are introduced into the problem space.

In an insightful paper The Gita of Robert Oppenheimer (Hijiya, 2000) authored by James A. Hijaya a Professor of History, explores many contradictions in Oppenheimer’s life, post the Manhattan Project. In this case the Gita refers to the Hindu scripture the Bhagavad-Gita which was one of Oppenheimer’s favourite books. The interest focusing on why one of the world’s greatest scientific minds used a Hindu scripture to help deal aspect of the Manhattan Project which resulted in the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Scientific rationality or logic cannot and does not address issues of morality, values, virtue, or ethics. Hijaya in reference to his paper stated: such a study helps to explain certain apparent contradictions in Oppenheimer’s biography, such as why a man of powerful intellect and personality would sometimes turn deferential and acquiescent, or why a man inclined toward pacifism would build an atomic bomb. There are simplistic reasons advocated by some that it was a threat of “us” against “them” (the Germans building an atomic bomb to begin with), then as a means to end the war against Japan quickly to limit loss of life, after Germany had surrendered.

In Oppenheimer there were many contradictions in his actions during his life as noted by Hijaya:

J. Robert Oppenheimer was an unlikely “father of the atomic bomb.” While studying in England in 1925, he had attended a meeting of pacifists. Soon after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were obliterated, he became a leading critic of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. On occasion he suggested that perhaps the United States should have given the Japanese a less lethal demonstration of the bomb before using it on a city. In 1959 he said that every time the United States “has expressed the view that there was no harm in using the super weapons, provided only that they were used against an antagonist who had done wrong, we have been in error.” He said that when the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, Japan was already “essentially defeated” and that nuclear weapons were instruments “of aggression, of surprise, and of terror”; that making armaments was “the devil’s work”; that the bomb “mercilessly” dramatized “the inhumanity and evil of modern war” and that the physicists who built the atomic bomb had “known sin”; that he himself had blood on his hands. He warned against a postwar nuclear arms race, advocated the international control of atomic weaponry, and, for a time, questioned the development of the hydrogen bomb, partly because such a weapon “carries much further than the atomic bomb itself the policy of exterminating civilian populations.”

“If you looked at his outlook on life, his philosophy,” his former colleague Joseph Rotblat said recently, “you wouldn’t believe that such a man would advocate the use of the bomb on Hiroshima—on civilians— and yet he did.” Not only did he build the bomb, but to the end of his life—even after acknowledging that he had blood on his hands—he maintained that he had done the right thing. How, then, had this gentle scholar brought himself to preside over the bomb factory at Los Alamos?

Morality and Ethics of thermonuclear bomb

Events following the Manhattan Project and the end of World War II, forced moral and ethical issues to come front and centre once again. This affected many scientists that had participated in the Manhattan Project. A proposal to build a thermonuclear device, a hydrogen bomb, a thousand times stronger than the one that levelled Hiroshima. Robert Oppenheimer was one of those who took a stand against building the Super as it was referred to. Many questions were posed:

Could such a bomb be built? Would it dangerously intrude on the “conventional” atomic arsenal? Was it a moral weapon? Could the country in good conscience build such a device likely to be used against noncombatant populations? Could the country morally not construct the new weapon given American perceptions of Stalin’s intentions and Soviet physicists’ capabilities? Did scientists have an obligation to build? (Galison and Bernstein, 1989)

It is easy to distinguish between the tame problems such as could it be built with the available technology and knowledge. It’s destructive power of the size of the blast zone could be calculated and thereby its killing power. On the wicked side, terms such as “good conscience”, “moral”; “perceptions”, “obligation to build”.

Galison also states that some scientists refused to work on the project, raising questions about morality, while many careers rose and fell on the issue. Some scientists vigorously advocated for the weapon on scientific and strategic grounds.

In contrast, by 1949 the very possibility of the H-bomb had propelled many prominent scientists to probe the ethical issues its potential development raised. Their questions sometimes differed, and often their answers – at least as revealed in the extant records – were unsystematic, even fragmentary. (Galison and Bernstein, 1989) The most brilliant of scientists were asking questions of morality not physics or chemistry, and their questions/answers differed, they were unsystematic and fragmentary.

Moving from the atom bomb to the H-bomb with its massively more destructive potential forced many scientists who had worked on the atom bomb to change their stance. There is no simple rational, logical reason for this change. Rather it is context, a context that has a past, a present and a future. A context that has the worlds greatest scientists with their own individual beliefs, fears, perceptions, anxieties, inspiration, values or any emotions to re-evaluate their position. Some may feel compromised, others clear in their actions. It is an emotive reasoning, not a scientifically rational and logical decision, which is normal for humans to exhibit as will be shown later.

Aspects of the Manhattan Project will be dealt with further to emphasize the characteristics of wicked problems and tame problems.

References

  • Day, M. A. (2016). The Hope and Vision of J. Robert Oppenheimer.
  • Galison, P., & Bernstein, B. (1989). In Any Light: Scientists and the Decision to Build the Superbomb, 1952-1954. Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 19(2). Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/27757627
  • Hijiya, J. A. (2000). The ‘Gita’ of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 144(2), 123-167. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1515629
  • Nathan, Otto; Norden, Heinz (1968) Einstein on Peace.
  • Schweber, S. S. (2008). Einstein & Oppenheimer: The Meaning of Genius. Harvard University Press.
  • Thorpe, Charles (2006) Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect. The University of Chicago Press.

Science under attack

Wicked Problems

Birth of a concept